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Abstract
In this paper, we present an intelligent, distributed fault management system for communication networks using belief
networks as fault model and inference engine. The managed network is divided into domains and for each domain,
there is an intelligent agent called Domain Diagnostic Agent attached to it, which is responsible for this domain's fault
management. Belief network models are embedded in such an agent and under symptoms observation, the posterior
probabilities of each candidate fault node being faulty is computed. We dene the notion of right diagnosis, describe the
diagnosis process based on this concept, and present a strategy for generation of test sequence.
KeywordsFault Diagnosis, Belief networks, Network Management, Fault Management, Sequential Decision
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1 Introduction
In a network management system, the role of fault management is to detect, diagnose and correct the possible
faults during network operations. Due to the growing number of networks that have served as the critical
components in the infrastructure of many organizations, interest in fault management has increased during the
past decade, both in academia and in industry [13]. Fault Management is based on three main assumptions
[7]: The objective is to deal with malfunctions, not the design faults, of the system, so it is basically a fault
diagnosis problem, not fault tolerant system design; Tests are more expensive than computations, so it is more
favorable to compute and infer the faults rather than brute-force tests; Mis-diagnosis is more expensive than
tests, so it is desirable to cover and diagnose as many fault scenarios as possible in a cost ecient manner.
In legacy communication networks, fault diagnosis is often not too dicult since the knowledge of the
network manager combined with the alarms reported is usually enough to rapidly locate most failures. But as
communication networks evolve, which are expected to be broadband, giant, heterogeneous and complex, things
will not be that easy. For example, a single fault can generate a lot of alarms in a variety of domains, with many
of them not helpful. Multiple faults will make things even worse. In such cases, it is almost impossible for the
network manager, inundated in the ocean of alarms, to correlate the alarms and localize the faults rapidly and
correctly just by his/her experience. Therefore, fault management has to be automated.
Knowledge-based expert systems, as examples of automated systems, have been very appealing for complex
system fault diagnosis [14] and the eort in this eld is still growing. Nevertheless, most of the developed expert
systems were built in an ad-hoc and unstructured manner by simply transferring the human expert knowledge
to an automated system. Usually, such systems are based on deterministic network models. A serious problem
of using deterministic models is their inability to isolate primary sources of failures from uncoordinated network
alarms, which makes automated fault diagnosis a dicult task. Observing that the cause-and-eect relationship
between symptoms and possible causes is inherently nondeterministic, probabilistic models can be considered to
gain a more accurate representation.
A conventional network management system assumes a centralized architecture where all of the monitoring
information has to be sent to the central manager for processing. One example is the simple manager-agent
paradigm adopted by SNMP [24]. Such a paradigm works well for small networks. But as the networks become
larger, the centralized paradigm will incur vast amounts of information communication and thus occupy too
much bandwidth unwisely. Since not all the data are relevant and necessary for the manager to process, and there
are many cases where the processing can be done on-the-spot, there is no need to centralize all the intelligence at
the manager site. In this regard, we propose to distribute some intelligence around the network, by dividing the
managed network into domains, and by embedding the network element with some codes for more responsibility.
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The embedded code within the network element is called a delegated agent. In telecommunications arena, the
capability of placing new or added functionality into network element is extremely important, especially as it
potentially provides network operators with a mechanism for dynamically updating network elements processing
logic. In conventional network monitoring systems, however, the set of services oered by the element agents
is xed and is accessible through interfaces that are statically dened and implemented. This service set can
not be modied or extended on-the-y without recompilation, reinstallation and reinstantiation of the server
process on the element agent. To this end, not only would we distribute intelligence via the delegated agents,
we would also provide a dynamically extensible interface between such agents and the manager site, such that
the manager could change the parameter values, and extend the functionality/processing logic of the delegated
agents dynamically. To fulll all this, we need a more exible network management framework, by adopting the
idea of managing by delegation [10] and the concepts of intelligent mobile agent [6][9][18][27].
In previous research on fault management [1][5][22], the term \fault" was usually taken the same as \failure",
which means component malfunctions, e.g. sensor failures, broken links or software malfunctions. Such faults
are called hard faults and can be solved by replacing hardware elements or software debugging and/or re-
initialization. The diagnosis of the hard faults is called re-active diagnosis in the sense that it consists of
basically the reactions to the actual failures. In communication networks, however, there are still some other
important kinds of faults that need to be considered. For example, the performance of a switch is degrading
or there exists congestion on one of the links. Another example is to model faults as deviations from normal
behavior [19]. Since there might not be a failure in any of the components, we call such faults soft faults. Soft
faults are in many cases indications of some serious problems and for this reason, the diagnosis of such faults
is called pro-active diagnosis. By early attention and diagnosis, such pro-active management will sense and
prevent disastrous failures and thus can increase the survivability and eciency of the networks.
In summary, our goal is to come up with an automated, distributed and intelligent fault management system
for communication networks, which assumes a probabilistic model and integrates the management of both hard
and soft faults. This paper focuses on the fault management aspects; The systems designs of the adaptive,
distributed network management framework are discussed in a sister paper [17].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briey describe the main ideas of our proposed
system followed by an introduction of belief networks in section 3. In section 4 we describe our belief networks
for fault diagnosis, dene the notion of right diagnosis and present the general fault diagnosis process. Fault
diagnosis strategies, or particularly, node selection schemes are discussed in section 5. Finally, we conclude the
paper in section 6.
2 The Proposed System
The managed network is divided into several domains and for each domain, there is an intelligent agent attached
to it, which is responsible for this domain's fault management. A domain is an abstract notion, for example it
might be a subnet, a cluster, a host or a member of a functional partition. For those problems that none of
the individual agent can solve, there is a mechanism by which the agents can report to a central coordinator
and share the information in order to get a global view and solve it cooperatively. So the whole system is,
from the agent point of view, a distributed, cooperative multi-agent system. Each agent is called a Domain
Diagnostic Agent (DDA) with the goals of monitoring the health of the domain, and diagnosing the faults
in a cost-ecient manner. A DDA consists of the following three types of components: Intelligent Monitor-
ing and Detection Assistant (IMDA), Intelligent Domain Trouble-shooting Assistant (IDTA), and Intelligent
Communication Assistant (ICA).
The Intelligent Monitoring and Detection Assistants are located at the lowest level and serve to interface
with the managed network elements. The inputs are data from network element agents and the output is the
activation status on the output nodes, each of which is called a Problem Denition Node (PDN) that represents a
certain type of fault. The functions are basically monitoring and fault detection. It will poll the network element
for operation information and execute some processing like threshold checking, etc. Alarms are also accepted.
In order to decide whether or not there exist fault(s), there must be some form of internal representations of
the concerned variables' expected behavior with which the comparison can be made. Such representations are
usually referred to as system models, and they can be set up in various ways, such as AR modeling or neural
networks, etc. There are many such IMDAs within a network management system and it is those that are called
delegated agents and are to be distributed to the network elements to achieve our goal of intelligent, distributed
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management.
The Intelligent Domain Trouble-shooting Assistant resides in the manager station and it includes a proba-
bilistic expert system, which consists of basically a belief network database and decision making modules. The
input is the activation status of the problem denition nodes, and the outputs are primary causes and the
suggested test sequence. Based on the activation status of the PDNs, a sub-belief network is extracted from the
database and then the inference and trouble-shooting begin, as shown in Figure 1. Given the extracted belief
network, the beliefs of any non-PDN nodes to be faulty can be calculated, based on which static or dynamic
trouble-shooting strategies can be adopted to generate the test sequence. Re-actions are embodied in the han-
dling of the alarms. For pro-actions, however, we have two implications. First, since the \abnormal" PDNs
with status other than \alarm" can also be dealt with, the diagnosis afterwards is actually pro-diagnosis in the
sense that it is dealing with something before it really goes wrong. Second, the belief network nodes are not
restricted to be physical entities, they can also be \logical" or performance nodes, such as \link congestion", so
that \soft" faults can also be included.












Figure 1. Illustration of an Intelligent Domain Trouble-shooting Assistant
When the problems cannot be solved by an individual DDA, the Intelligent Communication Assistant reports
the problems to an upper layer, where, by correlation and coordination, a conclusion can be drawn from a
global view. The inputs are results of belief computations and results from test sequences, and the outputs are
compressed versions of symptom statistics and of the results given as inputs. The output is then transmitted to
a coordinator in the upper layer via some communication links. For details of the proposed system, see [2][16].
3 Belief Network as the Probabilistic Fault Model
Definition 3.1. A belief network is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) in which: The nodes represent variables of
interest (propositions); The set of directed links or arrows represent the causal inuence among the variables and
the parents of a node are all those nodes with arrows pointing to it; The strength of an inuence is represented
by conditional probabilities attached to each cluster of parent-child nodes in the network.
A belief network can be represented as B = (V ;L;P), where V represents the set of vertices, L represents
the set of directed links, and P is the joint probability distribution stored as local conditional probability tables
(CPT). As a whole, a belief network represents a joint probability distribution over the interested variables
in a compact way due to the embedded conditional independence structures. Belief networks can also serve
as the inference engine, and can compute essentially any queries over the variables modeled within the belief
network. For example, as new observation (evidence) accumulates, it can provide the updated beliefs (posterior
probabilities) of the candidate faults and thus provide us the clue to do further diagnosis. In our research, we
use HUGIN expert system API [11]. An example belief network with each node assuming binary value, is shown
in gure 2, where the table associated with each node represents the conditional probability distribution, given
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Figure 2. An example Belief Network
Such a representation incorporates our knowledge of the problem domain, and without any observations, the









































Figure 3. Initial marginal probabilities
Now suppose we observe that there are call failures. We wish to infer the most probable cause for this
symptom from the belief network model. To do this, we input this evidence and execute the belief propagation.
Figure 4 illustrates the updated beliefs of each non-evidential node after such propagation. Note that for each
candidate fault node, namely Link Failure, Server Failure, Heavy Trac and Switch Failure, the probability of
being fault is increased.
If we also observe link alarms, then we hope that this extra information would help locate the most probable
fault. After input this evidence, we obtain the updated beliefs again, as shown in gure 5. As we would expect,
the evidence of link alarms legitimates the node Link Failure as the most probable fault, and this evidence
also "explains away" the other possible candidates, in the sense that the updated beliefs of other candidates is
decreased, as compared with those in gure 4.
The above example shows the sketch of doing diagnosis: obtain evidence, update beliefs, obtain evidence
again, and so on. One of the aims of this research is to decide which should be the next node to observe.
This is rather activediagnosis than passive diagnosis in that we are trying to nd the most relevant and helpful
information on the y during the diagnosis process. Note that as evidence accumulates, we may input them
one by one followed by a propagation right after each evidence-input, as we have shown in this case, or we may
input them once altogether and do only one propagation. This provides us the exibility to do either on-line



















































































Figure 5. Updated beliefs after observing Call Failure and Link Alarm
4 Fault Diagnosis Problems using Belief Networks
Belief networks models can be built to help fault management for communication networks. Faults can be
categorized as either hard , if they reect the failures of some hardware or software components in the network,
or soft , if what they represent is not failures but some performance degradation or deviation from some \normal"
behavior. Faults are usually not directly observable and fault diagnosis is the process of locating the faults based
on current observations (symptoms) and possibly further observations.
4.1 Belief Network Nodes Classication
In a communication network environment, probes are attached to some hardware/software components to get
operation status. The data returned from the probes are called raw data. Typically the raw data will be grouped
into vector form d 2 Rn and then processed to get an aggregate value that indicates some properties of interest
(e.g. average, peak value, etc.).
Definition 4.1. A statistics is a function from Rn to R that maps the raw data vector d to a real number.
Such statistics would usually be computed locally, namely near the network elements or even embedded in
them, and further quantied and represented using discrete values. We use value 0 to represent \normal", and
all other values other than 0 represent dierent level of severity of the statistics.
Definition 4.2. A vertex or node v in a belief network model B = (V ;L;P) is called observable if and only
if it represents the health status of a statistics, or corresponds to user report. The set of observable nodes is
denoted by O, and obviously O  V . Also dene the non-observable set ~O as ~O = V nO.
These observable nodes correspond to the Problem Denition Nodes (PDN) mentioned in section 2, and we
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restrict them to be leaf nodes only, and vice versa. We also restrict that all root nodes are binary valued.
Definition 4.3. The regular evidence set or symptom set R contains those nodes which we observe during
normal network monitoring operations. Each r 2 R is called a symptom node.
Definition 4.4. The test set ST contains all other observable nodes that are not currently in the regular
evidence set, namely ST = O nR.
Definition 4.5. The fault set F is the set of root nodes. Obviously F  ~O. For any f 2 F , f = 0 means not
faulty and f = 1 means faulty.
Definition 4.6. The hidden node set H contains all nodes in ~O but not in fault set F , H = ~O n F , or
H = V n (O
S
F ).
Hidden nodes may be intermediate nodes between faults and symptoms and we don't usually have the
interest to put queries on them during diagnosis.
Definition 4.7. The problem domain is said to be working in normal status with respect to regular evidence
set R if and only if every node in R takes value 0, or vector r = 0, where r = (r1; r2; : : : ; rjRj).
Definition 4.8. The problem domain is said to be working in abnormal status with respect to regular evidence
set R if and only if there is at least one r 2 R whose value is other than "0".
Definition 4.9. The syndrome with respect to regular evidence set R is simply the nonzero vector of values
for all elements in R, r = (r1; r2; : : : ; rjRj), and r 6= 0.
There might be cases when multiple symptom nodes in R take nonzero values. We assume here that any
syndrome may trigger the diagnosis process.
4.2 Fault Diagnosis Process
After the fault diagnosis is triggered, the evidence is propagated and the posterior probability of any f 2 F
being faulty can be calculated through standard belief network inference algorithms. It would be ideal if we can
locate the fault with eorts up to this; but most of the time, similar to what happens in medical diagnosis, we
need more information to help pinpoint the fault. In our work we postulate the limited observation assumption,
meaning that all the observation and tests are constrained within the belief network model.
Perhaps the most fundamental question to ask is: When can I say that I get the right diagnosis? In particular,
when can I say that a node in F explains the symptoms? What do we mean by explanation? Further, if one
single fault can not explain the symptoms, we are facing the multiple faults problem. Again, when can we say
that the nodes we are suspicious of are really the reasons?
Consider what a human would think during diagnosis. After obtaining one possible reason, one would
naturally ask, for example, \Would the problematic circuit work normally if I replace this suspicious component
with a good one?" He/she then goes ahead and see what happens after the replacement. If the syndrome
disappears, one can claim that he/she actually found and trouble-shooted the fault. If the problem domain is tiny,
not very complex, and the replacement burden is light, this paradigm would work well. But for communication
network environment, the story is totally dierent. As we mentioned in section 1, we would like to do intelligent
diagnosis via computation rather than brutal replacement before we are very condent what the fault is.
To do this, we need to distinguish between two kinds of semantics of the instantiation for a node in a belief
network: passive observation and active setting. All the instantiations of nodes we've been talking about so far
are passive observations, based on which we would infer how our beliefs of other variables would change using
belief propagation algorithms. For example we would like to know the consequences of, and the possible causes
for such observations, and so on. The alternative semantics is that we can also set the value of a node via
active experiment. One example would be the above question \Would the problematic circuit work normally if
I replace this suspicious component with a good one?" Note that in this situation, external reasons (the human
diagnoser in this case) explain why the suspicious component becomes good (because the human diagnoser
replace that) and thus all the parent nodes for this node should not count as causes during belief propagation.
To see this eect, we could delete all links that point to this node and thus make this node a root node, with
its value specied to \normal". Other belief updating like evaluating consequences, however, are not inuenced
by this active setting since as long as a node takes its value, its non-predecessors can not tell how this value is
obtained. This external force is called intervention by Judea pearl in his recent book [21].
With this set semantics, we could do virtual replacement in our belief network model. For simplicity, we
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assume here that the single symptom node is S1. For each node in F of belief network B, we could get the
posterior probability of being faulty given S1 = 1. Let node f be the most probable faulty node in set F , namely
f = argmaxg2FP (g = 1jS1 = 1). We would like to see the eects on node S1 by setting node f to normal,
in other words, we would evaluate P (S1 = 0jsetting(f = 0)). In our belief network model, all the possible
fault nodes are root nodes and we do not need to delete any links that point to these root nodes. Obviously,
P (S1 = 0jsetting(f = 0)) = P (S1 = 0jobserve(f = 0)), so in implementation this setting is treated the same as
usual evidence input. Other nodes in F are treated as background variables and they keep at the same status
as what has been just updated. Note that in belief network B, the node S1 has already been instantiated; while
our purpose here is to obtain P (S1 = 0jsetting(f = 0)). It would be messy to carry out intervention on belief
network B itself, since we would have to retract the evidence of S1 = 1 before intervention and then restore
this evidence after it for further diagnosis. In this paper, we introduce the so-called intervention belief networkeB = (V; L; P; S; Fs) to help this virtual replacement.
Definition 4.10. An intervention belief network eB = (V ;L;P ;S ;Fs) is obtained from the original belief
network B = (V ;L;P) with the same V , L, P . S is the symptom set and Fs 2 F is the set of suspicious nodes.
We would compute for each s 2 S the probability P (s = 0jsetting(Fsi = 0);8i 2 [1; jFsj]) using eB.
Here is the virtual replacement procedure for our particular example above:
 Step1: In belief network B = (V ;L;P), for each node fi in F , update the probability pi
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= P (fi = 1jS1 = 1)
 Step2: Suppose that f1 = argmaxg2FP (g = 1jS1 = 1)
 Step3: In intervention belief network eB = (V; L; P; S1; f), set node f1 = 0, and with P (fi = 1) = pi; i =
2;    ; jF j, compute P (S1 = 0jsetting(f = 0)).
To determine whether or not this virtual replacement has led S1 to an acceptable status, we need a reference
value for the computed P (S1 = 0jsetting(f = 0)) to compare with for such decision. Without any evidence
input, the belief network model B itself gives the probability of each leaf node to be normal. We could use these
values as the reference.
Definition 4.11. Given a small number , we say that node S1 becomes  -normal via intervention if and only
if P (S1 = 0)   P (S1 = 0jsetting(f = 0)) < ,
In the above example, we assume one symptom node and one suspicious node. More generally, we have,
Definition 4.12. A nonempty faulty set Fs is called the explanation or right diagnosis of the initial syndrome
r if and only if every node in set R becomes -normal if we set every node in Fs to normal in the intervention
belief network eB = (V; L; P;R; Fs).
It is when set Fs explains the symptom set R that we terminate the diagnosis process. In diagnosis, however,
it is always an issue how many suspicious nodes we should choose from the fault set F . In our belief network
model and the parallel intervention model, we should be discrete in choosing multiple nodes, since, if we simply
choose all nodes in F and do the intervention, the symptom nodes would all of course become -normal. But
clearly, calling every node in F as faulty is not acceptable; One of the most important goals of fault diagnosis
in general is to bias among the all possible faults and locate the real one(s)! In our work, we sort all the nodes
in F according to their probabilities of being faulty in a descending order, and only choose the rst a couple of
nodes as suspicious nodes to be input to the intervention belief network. In particular, if we let pi; i = 1;    ; jF j
denotes the sorted probabilities of the nodes in F being faulty, with p1  p2      pjF j, we only choose the




 PERCENTAGE GURAD; (1)
where PERCENTAGE GURAD is a real number between 0 and 1. It should not be close to 1, since in that
case, we would have to choose almost all nodes in F . In our work, we choose 0:4 initially and we are testing on
one single suspicious node on all symptom scenarios. If no single fault would explain the current symptoms, we
increase PERCENTAGE GURAD by a small amount and do the diagnosis again.
As discussed above, we would do intervention on those suspicious nodes. If they explain the symptoms, the
diagnosis stops; otherwise, we would have to determine a new node to test in order to get more information.
Since we can have at most jST j tests, and if we choose to test them one by one, the time step set is dened as
T = f1; 2; : : : ; jST jg.
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Definition 4.13. The active evidence set AE contains the nodes that are instantiated during the process of
diagnosis.
Set AE keeps a record of currently instantiated nodes. Initially, AE = R. As diagnosis proceeds, more and
more test nodes in ST are selected, tested, and then added into AE. Such already chosen test nodes are not to
be chosen again for future use.
Definition 4.14. The candidate test set Cst contains the nodes in ST that are available and yet to be chosen
and tested.
Initially, Cst = ST . As diagnosis proceeds, Cst shrinks as instantiated nodes are removed from it.
Definition 4.15. The action set A is dened as A = Cst [ fSTOPg, which states that during diagnosis, the
action a(t) we can take at time step t is either to choose a node to test, or just stop there.
Definition 4.16. There is an immediate cost incurred by selecting an action a 2 A during diagnosis. If
a = STOP , the cost is zero. For any si 2 ST , cost function is C(si; t), where t is the time step.
Cost function reects expense of a test, which is cumulative from many factors, like the diculty, time to
be consumed, severity, etc. The determination of such a cost function entails careful deliberation about what
factors to consider, to what extent, and how they should be combined. We assume in our framework that the
cost function is homogeneous, namely, cost function is of form C(si). This is usually the case in that the cost
is normally associated with the test itself only, and the test itself does not usually change with time. Our goal






c(ak) + f(ak; k) (2)
c(ak) is the immediate cost associated with action ak at time step k, c(STOP ) = 0, and if aK = STOP at some
certain step K, all aj = STOP for j > K. f(ak; k) is the measure for diagnosing steps, and we dene it as
f(ak; k) =

0 if ak = STOP
g(k) otherwise
(3)
where g(k) is a function of current step k. We simply take g(k) = 1 for all k in our simulation.
Using the same ideas of choosing suspicious nodes set Fs and executing intervention, various diagnosis
strategies dier only in how the action, or the next test node, would be chosen. We would discuss dierent
strategies in section 5. Other than that, our fault diagnosis process could be summarized as follows.
 Step 1. Initialization
{ For belief network model B = (V ;L;P), make a copy and call it ~Bt.
{ Set time step tp = 0.
{ Initialize active evidence set AE = R, candidate test set Cst = ST .
{ Input evidence by setting the nodes in set AE according to current active evidence values ae .
 Step 2. Belief Propagation in belief network B
{ Execute standard propagation.
{ For each node fi in set F , obtain the posterior probability P(fi = 1jAE = ae).
{ Sort the set F in decreasing order according to the probability of being faulty.
 Step 3. Intervention
{ Get the set Fs of suspicious nodes that satisfy (1)
{ Set the root nodes in intervention belief network eB = (V ;L;P ;R;Fs) accordingly, and execute the
intervention
 If by intervention, Fs explains R, update total cost and TERMINATE.
 Else, goto Step 4
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 Step 4. Get next testing node
{ If Cst = , empty set
 Update total cost
 Give out the set Fs and say "Didn't nd the right diagnosis, but here is the list of possible faults
in decreasing order".
{ Else Get node st according to some node selection scheme.
 Step 5. Observing test node st and get observation Zst
{ Input this evidence st = Zst to original belief network B.
{ Update time step, tp = tp+ 1.
{ Update the candidate test set Cst = Cst   st
{ Update the active evidence set AE=AE + a(tp)
{ Goto Step 2.
5 Fault Diagnosis Strategies
As shown in (2), our problem here is to minimize J over the possible test sequence (a1; a2; : : : ; ajST j). Let at
denotes the action chosen from set A at time step t; t  jST j, and Zat denotes the value obtained by observing
at, for example Zat = 0; for at 6= STOP .
Definition 5.1. We dene the history process up to time step k as
Ik = (Z0; (a1; Za1); : : : ; (ak; Zak)) ;
where Z0 =
 
(r1; Zr1); (r2; Zr2); : : : ; (rjRj; ZrjRj)

the evidence set and corresponding instantiations.
Z0 summarizes the history up to the time diagnosis is triggered. Ik grows along with diagnosis and obviously
we have Ik = (Ik 1; (ak; Zak)) and we call this history processMarkov . Since at time step k, the history process
Ik contains all the necessary information about the current status of the belief network model, we can simply
take the history process Ik as the state at time step k. So equivalently, our problem here is to create the optimal
state trajectory such that J is minimized. Before describing our diagnosis algorithm, let us rst see a similar
but dierent situation for intuition.
5.1 c=P Algorithm for Trouble-shooting Single Fault
Suppose we are given a similar yet dierent problem where the concern is to locate the single faulty component.
There are symptoms indicating the malfunction (e.g. car doesn't start) and for each possible faulty component
there is a direct test associated with it (e.g. testing whether or not the fan belt is OK), which tells whether
or not this component is working well. The cost for testing component i is ci. Based on the symptoms, we
obtain Pi, the probability that component i is in failure, for every component. We are supposed to test those
components one at a time. As soon as one component fails its associated test, we claim that we nd the single
fault and stop. There are many ways to choose the order of testing, so the question is: In what order should
we choose tests to minimize the expected accumulated cost?
For a test sequence f1; 2; : : : ; j; k; : : : ; ng with k = j + 1, and n as the number of components to be tested,
the probability that the jth candidate have to be tested is the probability that none of its predecessors have






i=j Pi, the probability that the faulty node is either the jth candidate
or its successors. So the expected cost is:
EC1 = c1 + c2
nX
i=2






Pi + : : :+ cnPn
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If we exchange k and j, then we get another test sequence f1; 2; : : : ; k; j; : : : ; ng, for which the expected cost
is:
EC1 = c1 + c2
nX
i=2
Pi + : : :+ ck[
nX
i=k
Pi + Pj ] + cj [
nX
i=j
Pi   Pk] + : : :+ cnPn
The dierence between the above costs is: EC1  EC2 = cjPk   ckPj , and it is straightforward that
EC1  EC2 , cjPk  ckPj , cj=Pj  ck=Pk;8Pi > 0
We see that EC1 is cheaper than EC2 if and only if the c=P value for candidate j is less than that for
candidate k. Thus, any strategy with an element that has higher c=P value than its successor can be improved
upon by simply exchanging the two elements. So for an optimal strategy, all elements must be in non-decreasing
sequence of c=P values [12].
5.2 Heuristic Diagnosis Strategy for Our Formulation
The problem used to derive the c=P algorithm is dierent from our formulation in the following aspects: 1. It
tackles hard faults or failures while our problem integrates both hard and soft faults. 2. It assumes that for each
candidate fault there is a direct test that tells the status of that component while we don't have that luxury.
For a communication network environment which is distributed, complex and heterogeneous, it is impossible to
predene and store a corresponding test for each possible cause. Actually one of the goals of our problem is
to generate dynamically the test sequence on the y, based on our belief network model and current syndrome.
This entails cycles of test node selection, observation of the selected test and belief updating, until we nd the
right diagnosis or reach the time step limit. 3. In this problem, we go ahead and test the candidate directly to
see whether or not it's the fault. But in our formulation, right diagnosis is dened via the introduction of the
concept of external intervention and determined through computation. 4. Finally, our algorithm should be able
to tackle multiple faults diagnosis.
But the c=P algorithm does provide insight in that it reects the following observation: in order to minimize
the total cost, people are more likely to try those more fault-prone, cheaper components before the less-probable,
expensive ones. In other words, people prefer more relevant and cheaper tests.
In our diagnosis algorithm, we look at the suspicious node set Fs and wish to nd an appropriate test node
st if Fs could not explain the evidence set R. Similar to the c=P algorithm ideas, we would like to choose the
test node from candidate test set Cst that is most relevant to Fs and cheapest at the same time. To achieve
this, we need a measure for relevancy between a test node in Cst and a fault node in F . The denition of
relevancy requires the concepts of entropy and mutual information, which we copy from [8] as follows.





The entropy of a random variable is a measure of the uncertainty of the random variable; it is a measure of
the amount of information required on the average to describe the random variable.
Definition 5.3. Consider two random variables X and Y with a joint probability mass distribution p(x; y)
and marginal probability mass distributions p(x) and p(y). The mutual information I(X ;Y ) is dened as








Mutual information is a measure of the amount of information that one random variable contains about
another random variable. It is the reduction in the uncertainty of one random variable due to the knowledge
of the other. If X and Y are independent, I(X ;Y ) = 0 meaning that knowing one random variable provides
no information of the other. If X and Y are actually equivalent (e.g. isomorphic), we denote X  Y , and
I(X ;Y ) = H(X) = H(Y ).
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Definition 5.4. The relevancy of random variable Y relative to random variable X is dened as
R(X ;Y ) =
I(X ;Y )
H(X)
R(X ;Y ) 2 [0; 1] indicates to what extent Y can provide information about X . R(X ;Y ) = 1 means that Y
can uniquely determine X , while R(X ;Y ) = 0 indicates that Y and X are independent. Note that R(X ;Y ) 6=
R(Y ;X). More generally,




where I(X; Y) and H(X) are dened similarly as above.
With the relevancy denition, our next test node is simply
st = argmaxg2CstR(Fs; g)=c(g)
5.3 Proof of Correctness Simulation
The belief network example in section 3 is over simplistic without many test nodes for us to choose from. To








Figure 6. Example Network
Two switches SW1 and SW2 are connected to each other via link L1. Machines A and B are connected to
SW1 and they would communicate with machines C and D, which are connected to switch SW2. We have a
probe a hooked at the end of SW2 to measure the trac throughput going out of SW2. Suppose the information
we could obtain during network operation include whether or not: SW1 alarm is normal, A could connect SW2,
B could connect SW2, A could connect C, C could connect SW1, throughput at probe a is normal, and D
could connect SW1. The possible faults are identied as: SW1 works normal or not, L1 normal or congested,
SW2 normal or not, and source pumped from C to L2 is normal or not. We set up a belief network model for
such situations, and gure 7 shows the structure and initial probability distributions.
As a comparison to our node selection scheme, we use the random node selection scheme meaning that each
time we need a test node, we simply choose uniformly one node from all current available nodes in Cst. In our
simulation, the outcome of chosen test node st is uniformly generated as either 0 or 1. The costs for testing
each leaf node is shown in Table 1, with 40 as the penalty for not being able to nd the right diagnosis. To
save space, we only list the diagnosis for the following symptoms: A Conn SW1 problem, A Conn C problem,
and A Conn SW1 and A Conn C problems happen at the same time. Table 2 shows the comparison of the
two test generation schemes with 2000 runs. We can see that node selection via relevancy is much better than
that via random selection.
Table 1. Cost for All Leaf Nodes
SW1 Indicator A Conn SW2 B Conn SW2 A Conn C Thru Prob A C Conn SW1 D Conn SW1
2 1 7 1 3 1 3
The above algorithm is heuristic and lack of rigorous analysis. We could model such diagnosis as a Markov







































































Figure 7. Example Network
Table 2. Comparison of Node Selection Schemes
Symptom Nodes
Random Selection Relevancy Selection
Avg. Cost Success Rate Avg. Cost Success Rate
A Conn SW2 15.38 84.5% 9.13 94%
A Conn C 26.21 70.1% 14.22 88%
A Conn SW1 and A Conn C 24.68 67.8% 3 100%
5.4 Dynamic Programming Formulation
For the sequential decision problem with state process as dened above, we have a discrete-time dynamic system
and the cost function is additive over time. let N = jST j be the total time step. At time step k, the immediate
cost g(i; u; j), incurred by leaving state i for state j when control u = ak is chosen, is simply ~c(ak; k), with
~c(ak; k) =

0 if ak = STOP
c(ak) + g(k) otherwise
(4)
As discussed in section 4.2, the diagnosis process would terminate if the suspicious node set Fs could explain








l=0 ~c(al; l), where gN (IN ) is the terminal cost incurred at the end of the process. Here, gN(IN ) is
a penalty for not being able to nd the right diagnosis.
Suppose up to time step k, there is no STOP action yet, and Ik = ik. Notice that the state ik is equivalent to
(AE k ; aek ), where AE k and aek are the active evidence set and the corresponding values at time step k. And,
the admissible control set Uk(ik) = Ak, with Ak as the action set at time k. Assume also that all nodes in our
belief network model is binary-valued. The state transition from Ik to Ik+1 depends on a control u 2 Uk(ik). If
u = STOP , Ik+1 = (ik; STOP ), and the process terminates. Equivalently, we could set Ul(Il) =  for all l > k
and thus the state process could go nowhere else but stay at (ik; STOP ). If the current Fs could not explain
the symptom set R, we could get P k
u
4
= P (u = 1jIk) for a particular control u 2 Cst at time k. Let i = Ik and
j = Ik+1 for simplicity. The next state j = (i; (u; Zu)) and the corresponding state transition probability Pij(u)
may be either:








To model the diagnosis process in terms of a nite horizon problem, we need to augment the state space with
a special termination state. Dene tk as the termination state at the beginning of time k, with tk = 0 meaning
terminated and tk = 1 meaning to continue. Initially, t0 = 1. The evolution follows: tk+1 = hk(tk; uk); 8k =
12
0;    ; N   2, with
hk(tk; uk) =

0 if uk = STOP; or tk = 0
1 otherwise
(5)
So by dening new state process Xk = [Ik; tk], we have the new state transitions Xk+1 = fk(Xk; uk), where
fk(Xk; uk) =
8>><>>:
Xk if tk = 0
[Ik; 0] if tk 6= 0; uk = STOP
[(Ik ; (u; 1)); 1] with prob. P
k
u
if tk 6= 0; uk = u 2 Cst
[(Ik ; (u; 0)); 1] with prob. 1  P
k
u
if tk 6= 0; uk = u 2 Cst
(6)
At time N , set tN = 0. It is easy to show that fk(Xk; uk) is equivalent to a transition probability distribution
PXkXk+1
(uk).
The cost function is then dened by
~c(Xk; uk; k) = tk ~c(uk; k);











which is the basic form of nite horizon problem [3]. We dene J
k
(i) as the minimum cost when starting from









Pij(u)[~c(i; u; k) + J

k 1(j)];8k = 1;    ; N;




(i), we could get the control sequences that achieve the minimum, and the solution for problem (7) is an





is a mapping from state to action for each k 2 T , that minimizes
the expected total costs. Ideally, we wish to obtain closed form solutions by dynamic programming techniques,
but this rarely happens in practice. So people turn to nd approximate values of the J-functions [3] [3]. We
would use Q-learning technique [25] [26] to obtain the approximations.
At each state i, instead of using J-function which is averaged over all actions, we dene a Q-function for
state-action pair i and a as Q(i; a). Q(i; a) represents the cost incurred by action a when at state i. If we
know for all states and all actions the Q-values, we could easily obtain an optimal policy by choosing the best
action at each state. Q-learning is a technique to obtain approximations for Q-values, and the update formula
of Q-learning is
Q(xt; at) (1  )Q(xt; at) + 





where  is the learning rate and alpha is the discount factor. It has been proved that if each action is executed
in each state an innite number of times, and  is decayed, the Q-values will converge to Q, by which an
optimal policy can be acquired.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we present an intelligent, distributed fault management system for communication networks using
belief networks as fault model and inference engine. The managed network is divided into domains and for each
domain, there is an intelligent agent called Domain Diagnostic Agent attached to it, which is responsible for
this domain's fault management. Belief network models are embedded in such an agent and under symptoms
observation, the posterior probabilities of each candidate fault node being faulty is computed. We choose
suspicious nodes in a discrete way and call them right diagnosis if they could explain the symptoms. The
diagnosis process is described based on this concept, and we illustrate our test generation scheme by using
the notion of relevancy. Simulation shows that this scheme is much superior than a random selection scheme.
Finally we formulate the diagnosis process as a nite horizon sequential decision problem and our future work
includes nding solutions with more rigor using Q-learning.
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